Intelligent Thought: Science versus the Intelligent Design Movement

As to not acknowledging your sources, sorry, I am not into argument by proxy. If you think they said something cogent, quote or paraphrase their argument.

I have already done so in regards to defining supernatural explanations. If you want yet more quotes because you’re too lazy to check sources:

Pennock Wrote:

Could science investigate God and the Creation hypothesis in the same manner that it investigates the natural world and the human intelligent creators that populate it? Could we have a “theistic science” as Johnson suggests that admits the possibility of supernatural interventions?… The first and most basic characteristic of supernatural agents and powers, of course, is that they are above and beyond the natural world and its agents and powers. Indeed, this is the very definition of the term. They are not constrained by natural laws. Indeed, on some views it is a supernatural creator that makes the laws in the first place, and those that make the laws have the power to break them. Of course, this is why humans hanker after access to occult powers, since they would supposedly free us from the laws that bind us. … The second characteristic of the supernatural, that we have mentioned before and that follows rather directly from the first, is that it is inherently mysterious to us. As natural beings our knowledge all comes via natural laws and processes. If we could apply natural knowledge to understand supernatural powers, then, by definition, they would not be supernatural. The lawful regularities of our experience do not apply to the supernatural world. If there are other sorts of “laws” that govern that world, then they can be nothing like those that we understand. Occult entities and powers are profoundly mysterious to us. … These characteristics of the supernatural show why supernatural explanations should never enter into scientific theorizing. Science operates by empirical principles of observational testing; hypotheses must be confirmed or disconfirmed by reference to inter-subjectively accessible empirical data. One supports a hypothesis by showing consequences obtain that would follow if what is hypothesized were to be so in fact. Darwin spent most of the Origin of Species applying this procedure, demonstrating how a wide variety of biological phenomena could have been produced by (and thus explained by) the simple causal processes of the theory. But, as we have seen, supernatural theories can give no guidance about what follows or does not follow from their supernatural components. … Finally, if we were to allow science to appeal to supernatural powers even though they could not be tested, then the scientist’s task would become just too easy. One would always be able to call upon the gods for quick theoretical assistance in any circumstance. Once such supernatural explanations are permitted they could be used in chemistry and physics as easily as Creationists have used them in biology and geology. Indeed, all empirical investigation could cease, for scientists would have a ready-made answer for everything.

That’s the long version, which is summed up nicely in Wilkin’s paper:

There are two ways science cannot be non-naturalistic. It cannot make the assumption that phenomena are themselves non-natural - it has to assume that everything observed is amenable to a naturalistic investigation. Call this methodological naturalism.

Science must also avoid non-natural explanations. This is explanatory naturalism. Any explanation that uses a non-natural explanans (thing doing the explaining) fails to be testable. I could propose that some process is the result of an Invisible Pink Unicorn’s powers. You can neither falsify nor verify this (in the ordinary senses).

Emphasis added. Note that I have made all or almost all of these arguments already, in my own words, and thus providing the sources was merely providing background information and not an argument by proxy. Otherwise I would have just said “Here are some papers, read them and see that you are wrong! Ho ho ho!” In order to pin down a supernatural agent or agents, you would have to be able to test them and isolate them and make them generative of risky predictions. The very “nature” of the supernatural denies this possibility.

When you do, please make sure you quote Stenger when he says:

I disagree. M[ethodological] N[aturalism] can be used to investigate God” (p. 12, my emphasis.) (I can’t believe you have been citing in your favour an article which claims that science can investigate the supernatural, has investigate the supernatural, and has demonstrated that there is no supernatural. Talk about “selective illiteracy”.)

Tom, that’s just disingenuous. I specifically said that I rejected Stenger’s assertion of supernatural conclusions because of the reasoning provided in the other sources. Your selective illiteracy is acting up again. More specifically, even in the situation described you only arrive at a supernatural explanation by declaring that no naturalistic explanation exists or can be concieved of. To me this represents a classic Appeal to Incredulity or Argument from Ignorance. Dawkins said that in the event no natural answer is apparent, that would should try to think a little bit harder. Failure of the human imagination and a lack of data do not constitute a valid conclusion that there is no natural explanation, otherwise I’m quite sure that Darwin’s idea of descent with modification would have been correctly ruled impossible before he ever put it forth. There is a real difference between saying “we don’t have enough data to make a natural conclusion,” however, and “we can’t accept supernatural explanations because they don’t follow from empiricism and aren’t open to testability.” So yes, I disagree with Strenger’s assertions. I provided them for the purposes of presenting a representation of your own arguments, while also providing other sources which show why those views are erroneous.

On the contrary. The hypothesis of deception must invoke some description of the actual state of the world; some conception of the actual state of the world in the deciever (both of which must be invoked by the non-deciever model); plus some conception of the apparent state of the world that the deciever wants the scientists to believe; plus a number of discrete acts approx equal to the number of experiments conducted as the deciever systematically distorts the data. That is not simpler. On the contrary it is far more complex.

I disagree. Both conditions, deciever or not, can involve the same number of premises, just with different possible truth values. The actual condition of the world either IS how we percieve it, or it NOT how we percieve it. (Empirically there isnt’ a way to tell). The experiments either ARE representative, or they are NOT. (Again, empirical data can’t discern if they are, because it depends on observations being true). The agent presumably remains the same, but here again we can’t tell if it’s a different agent, or whether there is one or more. All the numerous acts of a Creator could be to equivalent to acts by a deciever. Perhaps the deceptions are built into the acts of Creation as part of the process, making the two possibilities both quantitatively the same and in actual deed the same. Emperically, how would we determine any of that? Since all we have to rely on with empiricism is the natural world and our sensory input of it, supernatural agencies are free to violate empirical reasoning and thus empirical reasonging cannot ever pin them down.

Natural forces are not constrained by natural laws. Rather, the laws are just the description of how the forces work.

Fair point.

The laws constitute the description of the theory…

Vice-versa, actually. Theories describe the workings of Laws in terms of mechanisms and agents. Laws are simply particular statements that specific relationships exist.[/nitpick] In the vain hopes that this will clear things up further, allow me to present the relevant definitions side-by-side.

dictionary.com Wrote:

adj. -Of or relating to existence outside the natural world. -Attributed to a power that seems to violate or go beyond natural forces. -Of or relating to a deity. -Of or relating to the immediate exercise of divine power; miraculous. -Of or relating to the miraculous. adj : not existing in nature or subject to explanation according to natural laws; not physical or material;

Wikipedia Wrote:

While the exact definition varies, any concept of supernaturality requires that supernatural phenomena are not accessible by the scientific method. Contrary to common prejudices, science is not restricted to laboratory experiments but can be based on any form of experience. If a phenomenon is by definition outside of the realm of science, it therefore cannot be experienced and has by definition no impact on our lives

Pennock Wrote:

The first and most basic characteristic of supernatural agents and powers, of course, is that they are above and beyond the natural world and its agents and powers. Indeed, this is the very definition of the term. They are not constrained by natural laws. Indeed, on some views it is a supernatural creator that makes the laws in the first place, and those that make the laws have the power to break them. Of course, this is why humans hanker after access to occult powers, since they would supposedly free us from the laws that bind us.

Wilkins Wrote:

The usual way to define non-natural is that it is not explicable in terms of natural laws; that is, it breaks the causal chain. If we abandon the methodological assumption of naturalism - that everything is open to empirical investigation - we can say that anything not presently explained by scientific laws is non-natural, but that’s not what is meant. We can distinguish between our present ignorance and something that’s in-principle not scientifically explicable, surely. We want something that is completely outside the course of physical events [some proponents of the term ‘supernatural’ use it to mean ‘uncaused’ - what that actually means is really unclear]. But if we had it, could we incorporate it into a scientific explanation? We could obviously not use empirical observations - they depend on the ordinary course of physical processes. So what else is there? The answer is, nothing. Non-natural explanations are not scientific.

(emphasis mine) Empirical?

philosophypages.com Wrote:

Empirical: Based on use of the senses, observation, or experience generally. Hence, the empirical coincides with what is a posteriori. Empericism: Reliance on experience as the source of ideas and knowledge. More specifically, empiricism is the epistemological theory that genuine information about the world must be acquired by a posteriori means, so that nothing can be thought without first being sensed.

skeptic.com Wrote:

Empiricism is a theory which holds that the origin of all knowledge is sense experience. The term also refers to the method of observation and experiment used in the natural sciences. Often, empiricism is contrasted with rationalism, a theory which holds that the mind may apprehend some truths directly, without requiring the medium of the senses.

dictionary.com Wrote:

-The view that experience, especially of the senses, is the only source of knowledge. -Employment of empirical methods, as in science. -An empirical conclusion.

Wikipedia Wrote:

In philosophy, the term empiricism is used to describe a number of distinct philosophical attitudes, practices, and propositions. As a general rule, a philosophical empiricism emphasizes, perhaps exclusively, the role of experience in constituting some other category, for instance, concepts, existence, knowledge, meaning, reality, truth, or universals. The category of experience may include all contents of consciousness or it may be restricted to the data of the senses only (Keeton, 1962). In the philosophy of science, empiricism refers to an emphasis on those aspects of scientific knowledge that are closely related to experience, especially as formed through deliberate experimental arrangements. It is generally taken as a fundamental requirement of the scientific method that all hypotheses and theories must be tested against observations of the natural world, rather than relying on intuition or revelation. Hence, science is considered to be methodologically empirical in nature.

Notice how every definition of “supernatural” or “non-natural” pretty much eliminates the philosophical underpinnings of empirical methodology, if you try to invoke one in regards to the other. Supernature has every ability to exceed natural phenomena and constraints as well as the constraints of our experience, and remains inscrutible from such means. Empiricism rejects special revelation as a valid means of drawing conclusions, and since special revelation is just about the only way a supernatural agency can make itself or any aspect of itself known, to put it simply, this is why empiricism cannot be used to justly infer supernatural agencies over natural ones, nor can it distinguish between all possible supernatural agencies. Since supernature “breaks the causal chain,” you can’t use empiricism to infer the supernatural at work and especially not what specific kind of supernatural agent is acting. If you want to call that a mere appeal to definitions, tthen you should take the next step and see whether or not the definitions involved in this argument make your sstance valid or invalid, rather than just dismiss it as an appeal to definitions. Personally I find the proper use of key terms to be a crucial part of the logical process, otherwise I could be talking about a hat when I mean a pencil and nobody would be able to make sense of my ravings. This happens to be one of the very pillars of the whole “ID” shebang. Intelligent Design assumes that you can use empirical data (and, as you in your model claimed, simple natural facts) to infer supernatural agencies. Nearly every rebuttal to ID has shown that this is not the case. In all my admittedly few years of watching and participating in the “debate,” I have never seen anybody provide valid reasoning for inferring supernatural agencies from natural data. That is one of the reasons why ID is not going to be science.

I sense that this conversation is no longer going to be productive. I hope that, should you hit upon a way to draw supernatural inferences from empirical methodology and data, you will share it with the rest of the philosophical community and especially the philosophers of science, most of whom I’m sure would find it very important in rethinking what they currently consider scientific.