A previous PT post here discussed philosopher of science Joseph K. Cosgrove’s review of William Dembski and Winston Ewert’s 2nd edition of The Design Inference. I had some qualms and questions about Cosgrove’s conclusions. I hoped he would comment in the discussion. He was kind enough to contribute a substantial argument in the conmments section of that post. This included responses to my and John Harshman’s comments on his argument.

(For more links to the earlier posts on reviews of Dembski and Ewert’s book, and to Cosgrove’s review, see the link I just gave.)

In response to John Harshman’s comment Cosgrove commented:

On John H’s remark about my “trichotomy” of chance, necessity, and design: To our knowledge, blind processes in nature produce two kinds of outcomes: Chance produces random outcomes and necessity produces ordered outcomes. Both chance and necessity are involved in both types, but the outcomes still can be categorized in terms of one or the other. A roll of the dice, for instance, follows the laws of physics and so conforms to necessity, but it produces a chance outcome governed by a probability distribution. By contrast, the atoms of a chemical crystal have to line up in a deterministic pattern dictated by the equilibrium of forces. That is a necessary outcome although it also involves chance (which particular atoms end up where, for instance). Neither of these two types is organized (a sequence of coin tosses is complex but not organized; a chemical crystal is ordered, not organized). So my trichotomy is really chance, necessity, and organized complexity. If there is a fourth category in addition to chance, necessity, and organization I’m not aware of what it is.

To our knowledge, no mere combination of chance and necessity can produce organized complexity.

John Harshman then said:

Then one must ask what natural selection consists of and whether it is so capable.

I think this exchange is particularly important in evaluating Cosgrove’s argument, so I have put up this post, in hopes that Cosgrove, Harshman, and our other commenters can address this issue.

To see the comments, click on the title of this post or on the number of comments.

We will announce the winner next week at this time, noon, Mountain Daylight Time. Meanwhile:

Photograph by Alex Young.

Yikes! 1000 apologies, but: Al Denelsbeck points out that we (OK, I) posted inconsistent information regarding the deadline for entering the Photography Contest. Consistently with the original post, let us say that entries close in approximately 1 week, July 20 at 12:00 MDT (UTC-6).

Please do not forget the Photography Contest. Entries close next Monday.

A frequent contributor of posts at the Discovery Institute’s site “Science and Culture Today”, David Coppedge, has sternly lectured us evolutionary biologists: we “need a refresher course in natural selection”. He is really trying to straighten us out, wagging finger and all.

I agree that someone needs a refresher, but in this case think it’s David Coppedge. Did he ever get “freshed” in the first place?

Let’s look at the points he made, and see whether any of them are misconceptions, particularly ones we have exposed here as misconceptions, long before Coppege’s call for a refresher course.

Coppedge sets out his task thusly:

Abuses of the concept of natural selection abound not only in science news articles but in research papers in major scientific journals as well. It’s time for a remedial course.

At best, natural selection allows the fortunate to continue existing. I say fortunate, because a mindless process could not care what exists or not, and there is no guarantee that survivors will represent an improvement over what existed before; the survivors might be lucky bums. At worst, natural selection (hereafter NS) commits the fallacy of personification, ascribing the power of choice to impersonal happenstance. This makes as much sense as speaking of “natural voting.” NS doesn’t care who wins. NS is not a person. Extinction is just as valid an outcome of “selection” as innovating a new organ, eye, or wing. Other blatant cases of personification can be found in descriptions of NS as a “blind watchmaker” or a “tinkerer” or a “driver” and in Dawkins’ concept of “selfish genes.”

Before continuing, clear your mind of any idea of foresight, plan, or purpose as we consider what natural selection means and does not mean. Notice I do not call NS a process. The word “process” carries with it the baggage of programming or an algorithm. NS has neither.

Oy! “impersonal happenstance” does not tend to result in organisms with greater fitness? The particular happenstances that we talk about when we call them natural selection certainly do. Fitness is a combination of viability and fertility. And when an indvidual has higher fitness, it survives better and/or has greater fertility. Its descendants are better-represented in the next generation. By definition. No personification needed. It is just a matter of bookkeeping. And that bookkeeping results in changes in the genetic composition of the population.

Wasn’t Coppedge taught this in his high school (secondary school) biology class? Or in college? He has a B.S. degree in science education. Maybe he missed a few lectures. The university where he studied was Bob Jones University. Maybe there was no good lecture on natural selection.

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