Breakthrough for Intelligent Design? (Part 5)

This is part 5 of a series of 7 posts by Lars Johan Erkell, with comments on each by Ola Hössjer and a reply by Erkell. Part 1 will be found here. They are translations of 2020 posts in Swedish from the Biolog(g) blog of the Department of Biology of Gothenburg University.

Breakthrough for Intelligent design? (part 5)

November 13, 2020

by Lars Johan Erkell

Why is ID not seen as science?

In this series of blog posts, I have repeatedly criticized Thorvaldsen and Hössjer for not working scientifically, and I have said that ID does not meet the requirements of science. ID proponents, by contrast, often and readily claim that they are victims of a rigid atheistic scientific (Darwinian) orthodoxy that refuses to recognize intelligent Design as legitimate science. There may therefore be reason to very briefly review what actually characterizes established science.

Natural science strives to describe and explain physical reality. Explanations are limited to physical reality because that is the only reality we have the tools to investigate. So there may well be a spiritual reality beyond our explanations; We cannot know anything about that. Many scientists are believers and do not experience a conflict between science and their faith in God. Natural science is thus agnostic and not atheistic.

The scientific way of working is usually called methodological naturalism, meaning that only so-called natural explanations are used because that is the only thing that is practically possible, but not commenting on what goes on beyond the method. There is another position called philosophical naturalism. It involves the a priori exclusion of all kinds of supernatural or spiritual forces, thus an atheistic position. But that is a logically untenable position – it is impossible to know that there cannot be things one does not know. I have never met a colleague who is a philosophical naturalist.

This distinction is rarely made among creationists and ID advocates, even though it should be obvious. Scientists are accused again and again of being “materialists” or “naturalists”, by which is meant philosophical naturalists, i.e., atheists. But this is not true; science is, again, agnostic and not atheistic. There are believing scientists and there are atheist scientists.

But even though it is untrue that science would be hostile to religion, this is a cornerstone of the ID project. More on this in the next post.

Scientific work is based on explaining phenomena with the help of knowledge. The tides, for example, are explained by the gravitational force of the moon (and also the sun) affecting the sea water. We can measure, we can count, and we can confirm that the explanation matches reality.

Another example is population genetics. It is based on knowledge of genetic and molecular processes. With the help of population genetics, we can set up models of human evolution. Here, too, we can measure and count and evaluate our models. As we saw in the third post, Ola Hössjer and co-authors in their discussion of possible causes of genetic variation address five known factors: mutations, genetic drift, natural selection, recombination and colonization/isolation/migration. All of these are mechanisms that we know exist, and that we can measure and count on. We can have a fact-based discussion about how important the various factors are and how they work together. And we can get an idea of ​​how reasonable the conclusions are. This is science.

Now the authors add an unknown designer as a sixth mechanism. Then all opportunities to conduct a fact-based discussion disappear; we have no idea when or how such a designer would intervene. Hössjer and his colleagues seem to assume that the designer would create just enough genetic variation that their model fits. How can they know that? How can they test their model? It’s not possible. They have simply invented a designer with the characteristics they want.

As long as we stick to tangible and measurable factors, we know what we’re talking about. If, on the other hand, we invoke an unknown designer, we do not know what we are talking about. This is precisely why ID does not work as science. A designer explains everything and nothing^1,2.

Scientific theories tell us something about the world. Gravitational theory, again, says that the planets must move in elliptical orbits around the Sun and that they must not move in hexagonal orbits. This means that if someone comes up with a new physical theory that has as a consequence that the planets would move in hexagonal orbits, we can reject that theory. It does not match reality.

Intelligent Design, however, says nothing about reality. Since we know nothing about the designer, anything is possible and nothing is off limits. There is no design theory or design model that says anything concrete about the world, so there is nothing to compare with reality. It cannot do that because such a model must be based on knowledge of the designer. And we don’t have that.

Intelligent Design has never been formulated as a concrete theory. The only thing ID can offer is a “theory” that says that since science cannot fully explain the world, there must be a designer who created it. The idea is old and well known. It is called the teleological proof of God.

However, this does not mean that one can reject the idea of a designer behind everything - there could be one. Science does not comment on what is beyond the scientific method. But the project to make ID a working science is stillborn.

References:

Dawes, G.W. (2007): What is Wrong with Intelligent Design? International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, vol. 61, pp. 69–81 https://ourarchive.otago.ac.nz/handle/10523/565

Nichols, R. (2003): Scientific Content, Testability, and the Vacuity of Intelligent Design Theory. The American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 77, pp. 591 – 611. https://www.pdcnet.org/acpq/content/acpq_2003_0077_0004_0591_0611

Comment by Ola Hössjer

Part 5: Intelligent Design and Science

In the fifth part of his series of articles, Erkell turns to a discussion of scientific theories. This is welcome, because the major dividing line between me and Erkell concerns the philosophical starting point of science. Erkell writes the following:

Natural science strives to describe and explain physical reality. Explanations are limited to physical reality because that is the only reality we have the tools to investigate. So there may well be a spiritual reality beyond our explanations; We cannot know anything about that. Many scientists are believers and do not experience a conflict between science and their faith in God. Natural science is thus agnostic and not atheistic.

The scientific way of working is usually called methodological naturalism, meaning that only so-called natural explanations because that is the only thing that is practically possible, but one does not comment on what goes on beyond the method. There is another position called philosophical naturalism. It involves the a priori exclusion of all kinds of supernatural or spiritual forces, thus an atheistic position. But that is a logically untenable position – it is impossible to know that there cannot be things one does not know. I have never met a colleague who is a philosophical naturalist.

I fully agree with the distinction between methodological naturalism (allowing only natural explanations in natural science) and philosophical naturalism (excluding the existence of the supernatural), which I also discuss in my book “Becoming a Christian”¹². Furthermore, I agree with Erkell that natural science strives to describe and explain physical reality. But then Erkell claims that natural explanations are the only explanations that are practically possible. How did he arrive at that? It is simply a secular belief that underlies Erkell’s entire reasoning. Therefore, I believe that his claim that methodological naturalism is agnostic (implied objective) is completely wrong, because naturalism is also a belief.

To make it clear that methodological naturalism is based on a belief assumption, we can summarize this scientific method in the context of the hypothetico-deductive method. We then get the following three steps:

1. Propose a falsifiable hypothesis that contains only natural explanations.
2. Evaluate and see if the hypothesis in (1) is consistent with the data.
3. If the agreement in (2) is not good, go back to (1) and propose a better hypothesis.

If, therefore, in step (1) one starts from the premise that only natural explanations are allowed, it is obvious that science will only deliver such explanations. As you shout in the forest, your answer will be. I therefore believe that methodological naturalism constitutes a completely unnecessary limitation of science, since it does not allow a number of falsifiable hypotheses (which are chosen based on criteria such as simplicity, ability to explain, relevance, etc.) with different philosophical starting points to be allowed to be tested and compete on equal terms, so that the best possible model can be selected. Since science is all about searching for the truth, this is a very serious limitation of methodological naturalism. I treat this topic more extensively in two articles on secular science in the Scandinavian apologetics journal Theofilos.¹³ Furthermore, in parts 2 and 3 of this article series, I have shown that it is perfectly possible to combine the hypothetico-deductive method with a design perspective or a creationist perspective.

After his initial discussion on methodological and philosophical naturalism, Erkell goes on to criticize creationists and ID proponents for not making this distinction:

This distinction is rarely made among creationists and ID advocates, even though it should be obvious. Scientists are accused again and again of being “materialists” or “naturalists”, by which is meant philosophical naturalists, i.e., atheists. But this is not true; science is, aagain, agnostic and not atheistic. There are believing scientists and there are atheistic scientists.

This is another completely false claim, which makes me wonder how much ID and creationist literature Erkell actually read. Philip Johnson’s book “Darwin on Trial” formed an important part of the birth of the ID movement in the late 1980s. In this book, Johnson devotes an entire chapter to discussing the philosophical underpinnings of Darwinism. He then makes a distinction between naturalism and scientific naturalism, where the latter concept corresponds to methodological naturalism.¹⁴ Stephen Meyer and other well-known ID advocates regularly touch upon the philosophical starting points of the theory of evolution in their books and lectures, without claiming that evolutionary biologists must be atheists. More recently, the ID-inspired anthology “Theistic Evolution, A Scientific, Philosophical, and Theological Critique” was published, where I contributed with two articles myself. As many as nine of its 31 chapters deal with the philosophical starting points of the theory of evolution, with methodological naturalism as a central concept. Since the book is primarily written as a polemic against, and addressed to, Christians who have chosen to embrace both the theory of evolution and methodological naturalism, it is clear that the authors make a distinction between methodological and philosophical naturalism.¹⁵ In Sweden, almost every issue of the creationist magazine Genesis deals with the secular starting points of the theory of evolution, without assuming that all of those that hold on to this theory are naturalists.

Erkell concludes Part 5 of his article series by commenting on why Intelligent Design is not science:

Intelligent Design, however, says nothing about reality. Since we know nothing about the designer, anything is possible and nothing is off limits. There is no design theory or design model that says anything concrete about the world, so there is nothing to compare with reality. It cannot do that because such a model must be based on knowledge about the designer. And we don’t have that.

I have already argued in Parts 2 and 3 that this reasoning is incorrect, because I believe that it is perfectly possible to formulate falsifiable hypotheses that are inspired by the Bible or by a design perspective. But interestingly enough, evolutionary theory itself faces the risk of getting into the trap that everything is conceivable and nothing is forbidden (except that one must not violate the principle of methodological naturalism). For example, it is well known that the Darwinian explanation of genetic similarities between the organs of two species looks different depending on how closely related the species are assumed to be in the postulated tree of life. If the species are assumed to be closely related, the organ is believed to have originated in a common ancestor, which was then passed it on to both species, so-called homologous or orthologous organs. If, on the other hand, the species are not assumed to be closely related, the organs are believed to have evolved independently of each other through convergent evolution, so-called analogous organs. In other words, the theory of evolution always has an explanation for observed similarity, which makes it difficult for it to fulfill one of the basic requirements of empirical science – falsifiability.

1. See chapters 2 and 11 in Hössjer, O. (2018).

2. Hössjer, O. (2014). Is secular science unconditional? Theophilos 6(3), 489-496. Hössjer, O. (2016). Review of the secular science. Theofilos 8(2), 256-

3. Johnson, P. (1991). Darwin on Trial. InterVarsity Press, Downers Grove, Illinois.

4. Moreland, J.P., Meyer, S., Shaw, C., Gauger, A. and Grudem. W. (eds.) (2017). Theistic Evolution. A Scientific, Philosophical, and Theological Critique. Crossway, Wheaton, Illinois.

Reply by Lars Johan Erkell September 8, 2021 6:28 am

We fully agree on the distinction between methodological naturalism and philosophical naturalism, and that is excellent. But then you write:

But then Erkell claims that natural explanations are the only explanations that are practically possible. How did he arrive at that? It is simply a secular belief that underlies Erkell’s entire reasoning.

Yes, how have I come to the conclusion that the so-called natural explanations are the only ones that are practically possible to work with? For two reasons: the first is that natural science can only work with factors that can be clearly observed and that can be measured. It excludes supernatural powers that are not visible or measurable. The second reason is that, to my knowledge, no successful research program based on supernatural powers exists (correct me if I’m wrong - it would be interesting to be wrong on this point). So it is not some “secular assumption of faith” that is the basis of my reasoning. That is the reality.

You also write

Therefore, I believe that his claim that methodological naturalism is agnostic (implied objective) is completely wrong, because naturalism is also a belief.

Two comments: to claim that agnostic naturalism would implicitly see itself as objective is completely backwards. Agnosticism is a position which means that one does not think one can make objectively correct judgments in matters of faith, and therefore abstains. Then I want to point out that (methodological) naturalism is not a belief, it is an epistemic position that does not exclude non-material explanations.

So you’re wondering how much ID and creationist literature I’ve actually read. Far too much, is the answer. As for Phillip Johnson, I have published two posts about his book “Darwin on Trial” here on Biologg (https://biologg.wordpress.com/2011/12/08/fallet-darwin/ and https://biologg.wordpress. com/2011/12/14/creationism-and-naturalism/). However, he has a more detailed discussion of naturalism in the book “Reason in the Balance” from 1995. Here he derails already on the first page of the introduction:

In our greatest universities, naturalism - the doctrine that nature is “all there is” - is the virtually unquestioned assumption that underlies not only natural science but intellectual work of all kinds.

The next page reads:

For professional purposes, atheistic and theistic biologists alike must assume that nature is all that is. Natural science is therefore based on naturalism. What a science based on naturalism tells us, not surprisingly, is that naturalism is true.

This is not true. As I said, natural science is based on methodological naturalism, not on the philosophical naturalism Johnson writes about (“nature is all that is”). It is not assumed that nature is the only thing that exists, but that it is only practically possible to work with matter in its various forms. Of course, Johnson knows the difference, but in book after book he pushes the line that scientists make no difference between the two concepts, so really it’s the same thing. Natural science would thus be governed by an atheistic ideology, which would exclude ID explanations in advance. This delusion is a fundamental element of the ID movement.

I have some difficulty understanding why intelligent and well-educated ID advocates constantly confuse methodological naturalism with philosophical naturalism, but I can think of two reasons. The first would be rooted in the fact that in practical research work it does not matter whether one is a methodological or a philosophical naturalist. Since there are no methods to study supernatural phenomena, those kinds of explanations are disregarded. A person of faith can then get the false impression supernatural forces are completely denied, and that the two positions are actually the same - one would just use different pretexts to deny the reality of God. The second reason could be tactics in the debate around ID. By calling both positions “naturalism”, even methodological naturalists can be made to appear as atheists who refuse to accept any form of supernatural forces and thus rule out ID from the start. This makes them appear rigid and intolerant, which is a rhetorical gain.

So you write that

it is perfectly possible to formulate falsifiable hypotheses that are inspired by the Bible or by a design perspective.

Of course it is possible, but what can you test with your hypotheses? I address that in the post “Science, hypotheses and Intelligent Design” Finally, you bring up the idea that the theory of evolution would not be falsifiable, since it contains two different mechanisms that can lead to life forms being similar. They may either be closely related to each other or they may have lived under similar selection pressures, which may cause them to evolve into similar forms. This was a problem for systematics for a long time. Today, however, it is possible to establish kinship with genetic methods, which means that the mechanisms can be separated. If you now want to claim that a certain mechanism is the explanation for observed similarities, you have to provide convincing evidence that it is the correct one. And that reasoning must be falsifiable. You can’t just go with one or the other, as you seem to think.